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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3la19(1), 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues
In addition to the issues identified by Wallace Associates Business Properties Group, Inc.
("Wallace") in Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, the following major additional issues are presented
by this appeal:
1.

Did the parties agree to arbitrate any of the issues raised in the action from which

this appeal has been taken?
2.

Did Wallace present any admissible evidence that the contractual prerequisites for

arbitration were met?
3.

Did Wallace demonstrate that the district court was capable of making an

enforceable order to arbitrate?
4.

Was there an effective and enforceable agreement between the parties to arbitrate?
Standard of Review

All issues on this appeal are matters of law which do not require this Court to defer to the
district court's interpretation of contractual provisions or application of legal principles. E.g.,
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986). Accord, Brown
v. KFC National Management Co., 921 P.2d 146, 151 (Haw. 1996) (in reviewing a motion to compel
arbitration, u[t]he standard is the same as that which would be applicable to a motion for summary

1

judgment, and the trial court's decision is reviewed 'using the same standard employed by the trial
court and based upon the same evidentiary materials as were before [it] in determination of the
motion.'") (citations omitted). The lower court's decision should be upheld if there is any appropriate
basis upon which it can be affirmed, even if not stated by the lower court to be a basis for its ruling.
DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 provides in pertinent part:
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters
covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny
arbitration accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to
hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court.
Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However,
if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the
issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an action or proceeding,
the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding.
(Emphasis added).
RESPONSE TO WALLACE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Ekins' alleged that she and Wallace mutually agreed to terminate their Independent
Contractor Agreement. Complaint, R.2, \6. She further alleged that as part of the mutual agreement
to terminate the Independent Contractor Agreement, Wallace requested her to continue to work on
various pending transactions, that she agreed to do so, that Wallace agreed to pay her a share of

2

commissions received upon consummation of any of those transactions and that the Termination
Agreement (R.9-11, also Addendum to Brief of Appellant, Tab B) was intended to memorialize the
parties' understanding as to the particular transactions for which Ms. Ekins would receive a share of
the commissions received by Wallace. Complaint, R.2, ffi[7-8.
Wallace relies for factual support (Brief of Appellant at 4) on the Affidavit of David Jewkes,
R.92,1J20. However, Ms. Ekins moved to strike paragraph 20 entirely as hearsay.1
The Brief of Appellant (at 5) states that after the December 19, 1996, settlement meeting
"there was no activity in the lawsuit until January 31, 1997, when Ms. Ekins served Wallace with
Plaintiffs First Request for Production of Documents." The affidavit cited in support of this
statement does not say that there was no activity, but only that there was "no communication"
between counsel. Affidavit of John Robson, R.87, TJ4. Obviously, there was activity as evidenced
by the fact that Ms. Ekins and her counsel prepared an extensive request for production of documents
served on January 29, 1997, and a subpoena duces tecum issued to a key third-party on February 3,
1997 (Notice of Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum, R.22-30).
The district judge did not base her decision solely on waiver of arbitration, as Wallace
suggests at page 6, Brief of Appellant, and as it argues repeatedly in its brief. The transcript of the
ruling below includes the following significant passages:

1

Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of David Jewkes (the "Motion to Strike"), R.1056; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of David Jewkes, R. 107-14,
^7. Although the district judge did not rule on the Motion to Strike, she observed that "I think
there is merit to many of the objections, but I don't think that ultimately they are going to affect
the outcome of the motion to compel." Transcript of Proceedings, p. 27:3-6. In reviewing this
matter, the Court should resolve any issues of admissibility of evidence raised by the Motion to
Strike that are necessary to decide this appeal.
3

Second of all, and just as compelling in my mind is, Wallace & Associates has
not produced the guidelines that—for which there's any evidence were in existence in
1989. The plaintiff denies that she ever saw any such guidelines . . . .
* * * *

. . . . [T]his dispute as it stands is between two—an individual and an entity,
and it seems to me that—that the—Wallace has not persuasively established that the
arbitration clause actually applies.
Transcript of Proceedings, p. 28:22-25 to p. 29:1; p. 30:6-9. These passages clearly demonstrate that
the ruling was based on at least two major points in addition to waiver—lack of a meeting of the minds
on arbitration and inapplicability of the arbitration clause to the dispute raised by plaintiffs
Complaint.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS2
Ms. Ekins gave written notice of her claims to Wallace by letter dated September 25, 1996.
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, R.63, and
attached letter dated September 25, 1996, R.71. That letter gave clear notice that Ms. Ekins
intended to pursue litigation if Wallace did not respond within ten days. Id. When Wallace
finally responded by letter dated October 11, 1996, it stated its position to be that "Ms. Ekins has
no right to claim compensation under these circumstances" and that "Wallace cannot have an
obligation to Ms. Ekins concerning the transaction in question." Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings, R.63-4 and attached letter dated October 11,
1996, R. 72-3. No suggestion was made that the matter was subject to arbitration.

2

The facts summarized in this section were not controverted by Wallace.
4

Wallace's attorney stated to Ms. Ekins on December 19, 1996, that it was Wallace's position
that it did not have any contractual or other obligation to pay any commission to her for transactions
relating to the 410 Chipeta Way property.

Affidavit of Debra Ekins, R.76-7, ^[6.

Until it was produced in discovery in the action from which this appeal was taken, Ms. Ekins
had never seen the Salesperson's Policy and Procedures Guidelines—March 1, 1995 document (Tab
E of Addendum to Brief of Appellant) (the "Guidelines") relied upon by Wallace to establish its right
to arbitration (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings,
R. 3 9-40 and Exhibit B thereto) or any other copy, draft or version of such document. Affidavit of
Debra Ekins, R.75-6, ^2. She had no input into the content, language, drafting or preparation of the
Guidelines and was not aware that it or any other version thereof existed at any time while she was
an independent contractor to Wallace.3 Id. 1J3.
Ms. Ekins never received notice of any claim, demand, disagreement or dispute asserted
against her by any other salesperson involved with Wallace relating in any manner to the commissions
claimed in the suit. Id 1J4. Likewise, she has never asserted any disagreement, dispute, claim or
demand against any other salesperson affiliated with Wallace relating to the commissions for which
she seeks payment in the suit. Id. Colin Perkins, the Wallace salesperson to whom Wallace claims
it has paid part of the commission sought by Ms. Ekins, did not serve as a salesperson during the time
Ms. Ekins was an independent contractor with Wallace. Id. 1J5. Perkins apparently joined Wallace
about three months after termination of the relationship between Wallace and Ms. Ekins. Id.

3

Although Wallace attempted to show by the Affidavit of David Jewkes that Ms. Ekins
must have been aware of the Guidelines, those parts of that Affidavit were inadmissible, and Ms.
Ekins moved to strike them. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit
of David Jewkes, R. 107-14.
5

Shortly after Wallacefiledthe Affidavit of David Jewkes (R. 89-102) in support of its Motion
to Compel Arbitration, Ms. Ekinsfileda Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of David Jewkes (the
"Motion to Strike"), R. 105-6, and a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit of David Jewkes, R. 107-14, f7, challenging admissibility of all or part of thirteen paragraphs
of the Affidavit of David Jewkes. Although the court below did not rule on the Motion to Strike, she
observed that "I think there is merit to many of the objections, but I don't think that ultimately they
are going to affect the outcome of the motion to compel." Transcript of Proceedings, p. 27:3-6.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court's ruling that Wallace failed to show that the arbitration clause applies to any
issues in the action was correct for a number of reasons. Arbitration is a consensual matter.
Arbitration agreements are subject to ordinary rules of contract interpretation, including the
construction of ambiguity against the drafter. The parties' arbitration clause was not a broad, but a
very narrow, limited one which is not entitled to an expansive interpretation. Wallace failed to
provide an evidentiary showing that the contractual prerequisites for arbitration existed (a dispute
between salespersons that could not be settled). In addition, Wallace failed to provide evidence to
show that the lower court was even capable of issuing an effective order to arbitrate.
There was no meeting of the minds between the parties with respect to arbitration in light of
the reference to an unproven document. The arbitration clause, being unilateral, is not an agreement
to arbitrate subject to Utah's statute or arbitration. The arbitration clause, if given the effect
advocated by Wallace, is unconscionable and void. The trial correct was correct in ruling, under
governing and indistinguishable Utah precedent, that Wallace waived any right it might have had to
arbitrate with Ms. Ekins.
6

ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Wallace Failed to Establish that the Parties'
Arbitration Clause Applies to any of the Issues in the Action from which this Appeal
Has Been Taken.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 establishes two essential prerequisites for an order compelling

arbitration. First, "the existence of an arbitration agreement" must be shown. Ms. Ekins will address
that issue in section II of this brief. Second, it must be shown that "an issue subject to arbitration
under the alleged arbitration agreement is involved in an action or proceeding." The Utah statute is
consistent with general principles of law applicable to arbitration agreements. The United States
Supreme Court has laid down the fundamental rule that "the first task of a court asked to compel
arbitration is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute." Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626, 105 S.Ct.3346, 3353 (1985).
A.

Ms. Ekins Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate a Dispute She Has Not
Agreed to Arbitrate.

Arbitration must be consensual. Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v.C&A Dev. Co., Ill
P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1989) ("Although public policy favors the arbitration of claims, one cannot be
compelled to arbitrate claims."). A party's duty to arbitrate applies only to those claims or disputes
which she has agreed to submit to arbitration. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. CA. Reaseguradora
National, 802 F.Supp. 1069, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). An agreement to arbitrate must be "clear,
explicit and unequivocal and must not depend upon implication or subtlety." Waldron v. Goddess,
61 N.Y.2d 181, 461 N.E.2d 273, 274 (N.Y. 1984) ("a party will not be compelled to arbitrate and,
thereby, to surrender the right to resort to the courts, absent 'evidence which affirmatively establishes
that the parties expressly agreed to arbitrate their disputes.'") (citations omitted). In other words,
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there must be a clear meeting of the parties' minds with respect to arbitration. C.G. Trading Corp.
v. Sun-Fast Textiles, Inc., 201 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884-5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1960); M. Domke, Domke on
Commercial Arbitration, § 5.06, at 7 (rev. ed. 1997) ("The intent of the parties that arbitration be the
exclusive method for the settlement of disputes arising under the contract must be clearly
manifested.").
B.

The Rules of Contract Interpretation Apply to Arbitration Clauses.

In construing an arbitration agreement, the usual rules of contract interpretation apply,
including the general principle that the court should give effect to the intent of the parties as
evidenced by the agreement itself M. Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, § 5.05, at 6 (rev.
ed. 1997). Determining what issues are beyond the scope of an agreement to arbitrate "depends on
the wording of the contractual agreement to arbitrate." Brown v. KFC National Management Co.,
921 P.2d 146, 164 (Haw. 1996). Even though the policy of the Supreme Court of Utah is to interpret
arbitration clauses in a manner that favors arbitration, ambiguity in such a clause should be construed
against the draftsman. Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah
1986) ("This principle of interpretation is particularly appropriate when, as here, the ambiguity could
have been easily avoided."); accord, M. Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, § 5.10, at 25
(rev. ed. 1997) ("Any ambiguity in an arbitration clause must be construed strictly against the drafter
of the contract."). A court "will not supply terms or embrace a construction that would alter the
rights of the parties as expressed in the original agreement." Milton Bd. of School Dirs. v. Milton
Staff Ass'n, 656 A.2d 993, 995 (Vt. 1995). However, the "threshold for clarity of agreement to
arbitrate" is higher than other contractual terms require. Waldron v. Goddess, 61 N.Y.2d 181, 461
N.E.2d 273, 275-6 (N.Y. 1984). Similarly, the rules of contract interpretation apply where the
8

contract refers to another document for provisions governing arbitration. E.g., C.G. Trading Corp.
v. Sun-Fast Textiles, Inc., 201 N.Y.S.2d 883, 884 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1960).
C.

The Arbitration Clause in the Parties' Contract Is a Limited One
Applicable Only to a Narrow Class of Disputes.

Arbitration clauses may be broad, unlimited clauses providing for arbitration of all disputes
arising out of or related to a contract or any other dispute arising between the parties. An example
of a broad arbitration clause in a contract between a real estate brokerage firm and an individual
broker or salesperson is found in Waldron v. Goddess, 61 N.Y.2d 181, 461 N.E.2d 273, 275 n. 1
(N.Y. 1984)4 (arbitration nevertheless denied because contract had expired). On the other hand, an

4

eleventh: It is expressly understood and agreed by and between the
corporation and the employee that any dispute or difference in respect to any matter
covered by any of the terms, provisions or conditions of this Agreement or in respect
to any of the affairs or relations of the respective parties hereto shall be finally settled
by submitting the same promptly to arbitration upon the request of either party hereto
before the American Arbitration Association in the Borough of Manhattan, City of
New York. The provisions of this paragraph shall also apply in the event that any
such dispute or difference may involve an employee or employees of the corporation
in addition to the employee whether or not such other employee or employees submit
to arbitration.
And it is further expressly agreed and understood by and between the parties
hereto that any dispute or difference between the employee and any other employee
or employees of the corporation shall, if all of the parties to such dispute or difference
agree in writing, be settled by submitting the same promptly to arbitration in
pursuance of the arbitration procedure adopted by the corporation and on file with the
Secretary of the corporation, such arbitration procedure being open for inspection at
all times by any of the parties so affected. In the event that the parties do not
promptly agree in such latter case to arbitration in pursuance of the procedure of the
corporation (and delay in so agreeing for a period in excess of ten days shall be
deemed to be equivalent to failure to agree), then such dispute or difference shall
forthwith be submitted to the American Arbitration Association in the Borough of
Manhattan, City of New York, for final determination by either party to this
Agreement. (Emphasis added).
9

arbitration clause may be limited, i.e., narrowly drawn to apply to a specific class of claims or to
claims between specific parties or classes of parties. An example of a limited arbitration clause is
found in Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial Ltd, 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981).5 Where
arbitration is sought under a limited arbitration clause, the dispute sought to be arbitrated must fit
squarely within the terms of the contract:
The controversy must come within the arbitration provision of the contract before the
court can order arbitration.
. . . [W]e find that the construction contract is narrowly drawn so that only
certain types of disputes are arbitrable and that those disputes are required to be
submitted to arbitration only for a limited time.
Blount International, Ltd. v. James River-Pennington, Inc., 618 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Ala. 1993)
(affirming denial of motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration).
The rationale for stricter reading of limited arbitration clauses has been stated as follows:
A party who consents to the inclusion in a contract of a limited arbitration clause does
not thereby waive his right to a judicial hearing on the merits of a dispute not
encompassed within the ambit of the clause. In sum, the genesis of arbitral authority
is the contract, and arbitrators are permitted to decide only those issues that lie within
the contractual mandate.
Davis v. Chevy Chase Financial Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (vacating portion of
arbitration award as being in excess of arbitrator's authority). The Davis court further explained that:

5

This clause provided that, in the event of a sale of shares between the parties, the price
was to be the "fair market value" of the shares, determined as follows:
b.
The fair market value of the offered Shares shall be determined by mutual
agreement between the Corporation and the Stockholder. If they are unable to so
agree, the matter shall be submitted promptly to arbitration under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. The determination of the arbitrators shall be final
and binding upon Stockholder and the Corporation as to the fair market value of the
offered S h a r e s . . . .
10

Neither arbitrators nor courts, however, have the prerogative to redraft an arbitration
clause to require parties to arbitrate matters that they did not initially agree to
arbitrate.
Id, at 167. Accord, Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co,, 912 F.2d 1418, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 1990)
("The courts are not to twist the language of the contract to achieve a result which is favored by
federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.").
When an agreement specifies that a dispute between or among specified parties is to be
submitted to arbitration, the courts cannot compel arbitration of a dispute involving other parties.
Production Steel Co. vs. S.S. FrancoisL.D., 294 F.Supp. 200, 201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1968):
The arbitration clause, as its terms expressly and unequivocally provide, was limited
to the parties to the charter party, Jordan and Federal, and to arbitration of any
disputes that might arise between "the Owners" (Federal) and "the Charterers"
(Jordan), not to disputes with third parties, such as the shipper or consignee of goods.
Plaintiff is neither an Owner nor a Charterer of the ship and the dispute it presents is
not one "between the Owners and Charterers." Federal's attempt to expand the
arbitration clause beyond its plain meaning not only violates fundamental contract
principles but ignores the plain and limited language used by the parties.
(Emphasis added). The same conclusion was reached in another case involving a similar arbitration
clause. Import Export Steel Corp, v, Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co,, 351 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d
Cir. 1965) ("language of the arbitration clause incorporated in the bills of lading is restrictive in scope
in that it is limited to disputes 'between the Disponent Owners and the Charterers'").
The entire arbitration clause in the parties' contract reads as follows:
In the event of any disagreement or dispute between Salesperson and other
salespersons under contract with Broker which cannot be settled by and between the
parties involved, such matter shall be decided by arbitration, and Broker and
Salesperson agree to be bound by the terms and provisions of such decision. Such
arbitration shall be conducted as set forth in Salesperson's Policy and Procedures
Manual. Expenses of the arbitration committee shall be paid by first deducting
committee's costs and expenses before proportionate disbursements are made to
Salesperson(s).
11

(Emphasis added). The contract contains a typical integration clause in the next paragraph following
that quoted above.
The plain language of this arbitration clause stamps it as one of the limited, narrow and
restrictive variety. It has none of the sweeping, comprehensive language typical of a broad arbitration
clause. This one is limited to disputes between Ms. Ekins and "other salespersons under contract
with Broker" which cannot be settled by the salespersons involved in the dispute.
The contract consists of fourteen typewritten single-spaced pages addressing numerous topics,
including a schedule allocating commissions between the broker and the salesperson. Read as a
whole, the contract conveys the unmistakable impression that its draftsman (Wallace)6 both knew how
to provide for arbitration of disputes and made a deliberate choice not to subject itself to the
obligation to arbitrate any issue whatsoever between itself and the salesperson. The arbitration clause
was intended solely to adjudicate intramural disputes among Wallace's concurrently employed
salespersons as to their rights to participate in commissions which Wallace was ready, willing and able
to pay, but could not pay to one salesperson without another feeling slighted. For example, it is not
unusual in a brokerage office to find that one salesperson obtained a listing, while another found the
purchaser, or that one salesperson assisted with the marketing or closing process while another was
unavailable. There is nothing in the contract, however, to suggest even in the most tenuous way that
either Wallace or Ms. Ekins intended to arbitrate disputes between the two of them, particularly a
dispute as to whether Wallace was obligated to pay a commission to her at all. This view draws

6

It is obvious that the contract was a standard form prepared by Wallace in that the first,
second and twelfth pages bear Wallace's name in print while the generic "salesperson" is never
identified except by handwritten insertions in blanks printed for that purpose.
12

strong support from the Guidelines, which although not admissible against Ms. Ekins, constitute an
admission by Wallace that in 1995 "the Company's portion is not a subject of arbitration."
D.

Wallace Failed to Establish that the Arbitration Clause Applies to any
Issue in the Action.

In light of the foregoing legal principles and rules of construction, the lower court was amply
justified in ruling that "Wallace has not persuasively established that the arbitration clause actually
applies." Ms. Ekins' Complaint asserted no claims against any person other than Wallace. Her claims
are for breach of express contract, breach of contract implied in fact, breach of contract implied in
law, and promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance. R. 1-8. Wallace has never taken the position that
it is ready, willing and able to pay commissions in the amounts claimed by Ms. Ekins but is uncertain
only as to how to divide the commissions between concurrently employed salespersons. To the
contrary, Wallace has steadfastly denied having any obligation whatsoever to Ms. Ekins under any
circumstances. That is simply not the type of dispute that falls within the plain language of the
arbitration clause.
Moreover, Ms. Ekins' testimony stands uncontroverted that she never received notice of any
claim, demand, disagreement or dispute asserted against her by any other salesperson involved with
Wallace relating in any manner to the commissions claimed in the suit. Affidavit of Debra Ekins,
R.76, TJ4. Likewise, it is uncontroverted that she has never asserted any disagreement, dispute, claim
or demand against any other salesperson affiliated with Wallace relating to the commissions for which
she seeks payment in the suit. Id Thus, the express condition precedent for invoking arbitration--the
"event of any disagreement or dispute between Salesperson and other salespersons under contract
with Broker"--has not been shown to have occurred. Even if that condition had been met, the second

13

condition—that the dispute "cannot be settled by and between the parties involved"--has also not been
proven. Since this matter is to be reviewed as if it were an appeal from a summary judgment, the
failure of the movant to present admissible evidence to support its position must be regarded as fatal
to its motion.
If the plain language of the contract is not deemed to be dispositive of this appeal in favor of
Ms. Ekins, then the arbitration clause must be viewed as ambiguous. Ambiguity caused by Wallace,
the drafter of the contract, must be construed against it. Any ambiguity as to what constitutes a
"disagreement or dispute" between salespersons must be construed against Wallace. Any ambiguity
as to what is meant by the phrase "which cannot be settled by and between the parties involved" must
be construed against Wallace. Given Wallace's failure to prove the existence or content of the
Salesperson's Policy and Procedures Manual referred to in the arbitration clause, ambiguities are
created by the last sentence of the arbitration clause referring to the unidentified "arbitration
committee" and payment of its "expenses."
Another buttress supporting the trial court's ruling is the manifest intent of Wallace not to
require arbitration of any issues between itself and Ms. Ekins. As discussed at 12-3, supra, Wallace
carefully crafted the arbitration clause to exempt itself from coverage, and its subsequent conduct in
issuing the Guidelines confirms that it so intended.
E.

Wallace Failed to Demonstrate that the District Court Was Capable of
Granting an Effective or Enforceable Order to Arbitrate.

Still another basis for the propriety of the ruling below is found in the statutory language
regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements. Section 78-3 la-4(l) of the Utah Code directs the
courts to "order the parties to arbitrate" upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
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arbitration agreement (emphasis added). That provision presupposes that the parties to the dispute
are before the court. Otherwise, it could not enter an effective order compelling them to arbitrate or
otherwise satisfy the requirements of due process vis-a-vis the absent party or even the parties already
before the court. For example, if the court had ordered arbitration, its order could not bind the absent
third party salesperson, who may not be subject to any duty to arbitrate or whose contract may
contain an arbitration clause that requires arbitration to proceed within a specific time limit which may
have already passed7 or under specific procedures which are not applicable to Ms. Ekins because she
did not agree to them. Again, Wallace failed to meet its burden of proving that the salesperson
allegedly seeking the same commissions claimed by Ms. Ekins is under a duty to arbitrate or what
procedural rules apply to arbitration involving that party. The risk is extremely high that an order
compelling arbitration could not be obeyed because of the rights of third parties whom the court
cannot control. The trial court was justifiably reticent to issue an order that it may be powerless to
enforce.
Utah Code Ann. 78-31a-4(2) adds:
If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement is
involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear
motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. Otherwise, the
motion shall be made to a court with proper venue.
(Emphasis added). Section 78-31a-4(3) further provides:

7

While the Guidelines are not binding on Ms. Ekins, they may be binding on the allegedly
competing salesperson. If so, the strict time limit for commencing arbitration has probably
passed. The Guidelines require the arbitration to be commenced after the "Company" (Wallace)
receives the commission payment but before it has been distributed to salespersons (R.57-8, pp. 34). Failure to demand arbitration within the time limit provided in the arbitration clause
constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate. E.g., Southern Motels Investment Corp. v. Tower
Contracting Co., 174 So.2d 852, 857 (La. App. 1965).
15

An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding
involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, if the issue
is severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the issue subject
to arbitration is stayed.
(Emphasis added). When read together, it is clear that these statutory rules require the movant to
show that there exists an agreement to arbitrate the same issue that would otherwise be litigated in
the court. Wallace failed to meet this burden, but instead relied on a totally extraneous arbitration
provision that applies to disputes between Wallace's salespersons. Wallace presented no admissible
evidence that any such dispute exists,8 and the Affidavit of Debra Ekins (R.75-7) attested that it does
not.
The core issue in this action is whether Ekins is entitled to be paid a commission by Wallace
for services rendered which have produced or will in the future produce commission income to
Wallace. Wallace has consistently denied that it has any such obligation. If Wallace had conceded
that it owes commissions to Ekins for the services described in the Complaint, had proven that there
is a bona fide issue with respect to the proper allocation of the commissions as between Ekins and
another salesperson, and had demonstrated that the other salesperson was then under a duty to
arbitrate pursuant to procedural rules which could be fairly applied to Ms. Ekins, then the arbitration
clause might have been relevant. However, since there is no dispute between Ekins and any other
salesperson regarding allocation or division of commissions, arbitration would not resolve a single

Wallace apparently intends to argue, after Ms. Ekins has filed her brief and has no
further opportunity to respond, that the statement in the Affidavit of David Jewkes (R.91-2, ^[18)
that Wallace had paid commissions to another salesperson for the transactions described in the
Complaint and that this proves the existence of a dispute between salespersons. First, paragraph
18 was the subject of a Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of David Jewkes (R. 109-10, ffiJ56), which was well taken and which this Court can decide if necessary to resolve this appeal.
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issue in the case from which this appeal arises, but would serve only to allow Wallace to delay the
resolution of the real issue, namely Wallace's liability to Ekins.
EL

No Effective and Enforceable Agreement to Arbitrate Exists.
For the reasons explained below, the parties failed to reach an enforceable agreement to

arbitrate.
A.

Wallace's Attempt to Incorporate Arbitration Rules by Reference in the
Contract Was Ineffective, Resulting in a Failure of a Meeting of the
Minds.

In a case closely parallel to the present one the contract contained a broad arbitration clause
(unlike that of Ms. Ekins and Wallace) requiring that "[a]ll disputes, controversies, or differences
which may arise between the parties, out of or in relation to or in connection with this contract, or
for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration pursuant to the Worth Street Rules by
which each party herein is bound." C.G. Trading Corp. v. Sun-Fast Textiles, Inc., 201 N.Y.S.2d 883,
884 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1960). Those "Rules" stated that the industry had chosen arbitration for settling
differences but did not contain the actual arbitration procedures. The "Rules" said that the provisions
of the "Standard Cotton Textile Sales Note" may be incorporated in any textile contract by a clause
subjecting the parties' sales note to yet another document containing arbitration procedures. The
parties' sales note, however, did not contain such a clause. A motion to stay litigation pending
arbitration was denied on the grounds that the contract was "imperfectly executed since the Worth
Street Rules by mere reference thereto do not provide for arbitration and the incorporation of the
Worth Street Rules cannot be said to bind the parties to arbitrate in a particular manner." Id at 885.
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In similar fashion, Ms. Ekins and Wallace signed an agreement containing a covenant to
arbitrate, albeit only a narrow class of disputes (those arising between salespersons) "as set forth in
Salesperson's Policy and Procedures Manual." The contents of that Manual, if it ever existed, are
not known to the parties. Although Wallace submitted a document entitled "Salesperson's Policy and
Procedures Guidelines-March 1, 1995," neither its title nor its date are consistent with the reference
in the parties' contract. The "Manual" appears to have been (from Wallace's point of view) a
material part of Wallace's adhesion contract requiring arbitration, as evidenced by the reference in
the contract to an "arbitration committee" and to the allocation of expenses of the "committee" to
salespersons (rather than to Wallace). Thus, the absence of evidence as to the existence or contents
of the Manual and Ms. Ekins' unawareness of its existence or contents defeat the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate that is enforceable as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-4 (relief is
premised upon a motion "showing the existence of an arbitration agreement").9
B.

Mutuality of Obligation Is Absent.

To be valid an arbitration agreement requires mutuality of the duty to arbitrate. See M.
Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, § 5.06, at 8 (rev. ed. 1997). Here, Wallace did not agree
to arbitrate any dispute with Ms. Ekins. Since the arbitration clause is unilateral, it fails for lack of

9

Wallace has previously argued that the trial court can compensate for the missing rules
by appointing arbitrators under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-5. The court's authority under that
section appears to be far more limited than Wallace contends. The statute deals only with the lack
of a "procedure for appointment of arbitrators." It does not authorize the court to fabricate the
rules of engagement by which the arbitration is to be conducted. There is no evidence in the
record as to whether the missing Manual addressed notification of the parties' claims, evidence or
contentions, discovery, hearing procedures, time limits for initiating arbitration or such matters as
shifting of attorneys' fees (most of which are addressed in the 1995 Guidelines). The court
cannot write the parties' contract for them.
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mutuality. Id. § 5.09, at 18 (grant of unilateral right to arbitrate is not an agreement to arbitrate).
Without the "existence of an arbitration agreement" as per Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4, the court
lacks authority to compel arbitration.
C.

The Arbitration Agreement Is an Unconscionable Contract of Adhesion.

The contract between the parties was a standard form drafted by Wallace and apparently
presented to Ms. Ekins on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Although it addressed arbitration, it referred
to yet another "take-it-or-leave-it" document (the Manual) which Ms. Ekins did not even see for
material terms of the arbitration mechanism.
If, despite the foregoing arguments to the contrary, the 1995 Guidelines were somehow
binding on Ekins, they cannot be enforced because they contain unconscionable provisions, such as
requiring the arbitrators to be appointed from the salespersons working for Wallace.10 Since the
critical requirement of neutrality is missing, arbitration cannot be compelled. E.g., Reed v. Davis
County School Dist., 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah App. 1995) ("Arbitration always includes
presentation of the conflicting claims to a neutral third party for resolution."). Forcing Ekins to select
arbitrators from Wallace's own ranks guarantees partiality, not neutrality, and is substantively
unconscionable. In Sosa v. Pernios, 924 P.2d 357, 361-3 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable, both procedurally and substantively, and therefore
unenforceable, and that substantive unconscionability is measured by whether the terms are "so onesided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party." Id at 361. Clearly, the terms of the

10

Under Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10 a real estate salesperson is prohibited from acting as
such without being affiliated with a licensed broker and cannot affiliate with more than one broker
simultaneously.
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Guidelines would have been a surprise to Ekins, who never saw them. Their one-sided nature lies
primarily in the lack of neutrality. In a similar case in which the arbitrators were to be chosen from
the ranks of one party's insiders, the court held the arbitration provision void, reasoning in part as
follows:
Unless we close our eyes to realities, the agreement here becomes, not a contract to
arbitrate, but an engagement to capitulate.
Cross & Brown Co. v. Nelson, 4 App. Div. 2d 501, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1957). Where a party has
sought to overreach with an unfair arbitration clause, public policy is best served by holding the
agreement void rather than merely excising the most offensive part of the clause and enforcing the
remainder. It is clearly in the public interest to foster fair methods of alternative dispute resolution.
For this reason, clauses smacking of gamesmanship should be rejected entirely as Justice Durham
advocated in Sosa v. Pernios, 924 P.2d at 364 ("a severance clause enforced in this fashion would
encourage procedural and substantive overreaching because the stronger party has nothing to lose
by trying to intimidate").
Moreover, the Guidelines require the arbitration to be commenced after the "Company"
(Wallace) receives the commission payment, but before it has been distributed to salespersons (R.578, pp. 3-4). As applied to a former salesperson, such as Ms. Ekins, who has no inside knowledge as
to when payments are received and distributed by Wallace, this creates an unconscionable barrier to
any remedy at all. Apparently what Wallace wants to force Ms. Ekins to do is to submit a dead-onarrival arbitration claim that its insiders, posing as arbitrators, can summarily dismiss for technical
non-compliance with Guidelines that were never given to her.11

11

If not requested prior to distribution of the commission, arbitration is waived. R.58.
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HI.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Wallace Waived any Right to Arbitrate.
In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), the Supreme

Court of Utah ruled that a party seeking to compel arbitration had waived the right to compel
arbitration by participating in the litigation of the claim sought to be arbitrated for a period of five
months. Here, Wallace was notified of Ms. Ekins' claim and of her intent to litigate it by letter dated
September 25, 1996. R.71. Nearly six months passed before Wallace moved for arbitration. In the
meantime, itfiledan Answer (R. 15-51) submitting to the jurisdiction of the district court and failing
to assert any affirmative defense with respect to arbitration. The failure to plead the affirmative
defense of an arbitration agreement is a waiver of arbitration in and of itself. M. Domke, Domke on
Commercial Arbitration, § 19.01, at 2 (rev. ed. 1997) ("failure to plead the arbitration clause as a
defense to the lawsuit will be considered a waiver of the party's rights arising under the clause"); see
Gunderson v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.App.3d 138, 143-5, 120 Cal.Rptr.
35, 38-9 (1975) (arbitration denied where defendant failed to plead it as a defense, failed to follow
contractual steps to designate arbitrator and participated in litigation for six months).
If, as Wallace contends, the Guidelines are applicable, the party seeking arbitration (either
Wallace or the other salesperson) was required to deliver a written demand for arbitration to the
Company Manager with a designation of an arbitrator. Since no time limit was specified, a reasonable
time limit would apply. Replies and designation of an arbitrator by the "Respondent" would come
due ten days later. After another ten days, the two designated arbitrators would be required to select
one or two additional arbitrators. There is no evidence that Wallace or anyone else took any of these
steps. That failure alone constitutes a waiver of arbitration. In Gunderson, the court ruled:
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In addition to their failure to plead the arbitration clause in their answer, and
in addition to the delay in seeking to enforce the clause by petition . . . after the
plaintiff had refused arbitration, the conduct of the respondents was clearly
inconsistent with any real intent to arbitrate.
The agreement provides that, within fifteen days after respondents made their
February 25th demand, they should have designated their arbitrator. This they did not
do. Impliedly, by that omission, they accepted the refusal.
46 Cal.App.3d at 144, 120 Cal.Rptr. at 39 (1975).
In addition to the foregoing bases for a determination of waiver, Wallace participated in the
litigation of this matter for four months before seeking to compel arbitration. During that time,
Wallace responded to a request for production of documents from Ms. Ekins and supplied numerous
documents, all without asserting any objection based on an agreement to arbitrate. Ms. Ekins
subpoenaed documents from a critical third party, Salt Lake Research Associates Limited, the
landlord of all of the properties on which Ms. Ekins seeks payment of leasing commissions. Wallace
obtained copies of documents produced by the landlord through Ms. Ekins' discovery, thereby
gaining access to documents that may not have been available in the arbitration forum (inasmuch as
the Guidelines do not provide for any discovery). Wallace has substantially participated in this
litigation for a significant period of time to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate.
During the six months after Ms. Ekins gave notice of her claim and the four months after
litigation began, Ms. Ekins has incurred significant expenses and attorney's fees in preparing, filing
and serving the Complaint and performing related legal and factual research and analysis, in pursuing
discovery and otherwise. In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 361 (Utah
1992), the majority held that the trial court's "finding of prejudice is also supported by the expense
that plaintiffs undertook in conducting discovery into Blue Cross's liability and in preparing to
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respond to Blue Cross's discovery request." In short, any non-trivial litigation expense incurred by
a plaintiff after joinder of a party who fails to assert the affirmative defense of arbitration and later
claims a right to arbitrate is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice. Kramer v. Hammond, 943
F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1991) (prejudice found when a party "too long postpones his invocation of
his contractual right to arbitration, and thereby causes his adversary to incur unnecessary delay or
expense"). In addition, "prejudice can occur if a party gains an advantage in arbitration through
participation in pretrial procedures." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. Both of these forms of prejudice
were shown to exist in the instant case. Discovery was undertaken (the cost of which is readily
apparent), and Wallace availed itself of the benefit thereof. Justice Zimmerman's concurring and
dissenting opinion in Chandler characterized the facts supporting waiver in the following terms:
At bottom, all we have here is the passage of close to five months and the
almost entirely passive participation of a newly joined party in ongoing litigation.
Id. at 362. Thus, even though participation in the Chandler litigation was modest and prejudice was
not dramatic, waiver of arbitration was nevertheless found and affirmed on appeal, and Chandler is
controlling law. Because there is no material distinction between this case and Chandler, the trial
court's ruling that Wallace waived any right that may have existed to arbitrate is entirely consistent
with governing precedent.
IV.

Conclusion
Ms. Ekins respectfully requests that the lower court's order be affirmed and costs and

attorneys' fees awarded to her for defending this appeal.
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